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On 22 December 2008 the Federal Republic of Germany initialized proceedings 
against the Italian Republic before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in The 
Hague.1 In January 2011 Greece applied for permission to intervene in the case. 
On 4 July 2011 the ICJ decided that Greece is permitted to intervene as a non-
party in the case, pursuant to Article 62 of the Statute.2 Public hearings in The 
Hague will take place from 12 to 16 September 2011. 
The outcome of this “Case Concerning Jurisdictional Immunities” is of cen-
tral significance for the future of the transnational enforcement of human rights 
insofar as the ICJ decision will determine the role national courts are to play in 
the enforcement of compensation claims under civil law in the field of “transi-
tional justice.” Consequently, it will also determine how the tension between 
human rights, on the one hand, and state immunity, on the other, is to be ad-
justed. If one conceives “transnational law” in the vein of Philip C. Jessup3 – 
i.e. as law that breaks with the paradigm of an ius inter gentes, which can be 
invoked by individuals and which transcends the dualism of national and inter-
national law4 – it can be concluded that the future of transnational law and the 
leeway for the transnational enforcement strategies of civil societal actors5 de-
pend significantly on the course of the proceedings in The Hague. 
                                                 
1 ICJ, Case concerning Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy); the 
current status of proceedings and documents are available at www.icj-cij.org; a 
counter-claim, submitted by Italy, which seeks to espouse Italian victims of Nazi 
crimes, was declared inadmissible on 20 July 2010 due to lack of temporal jurisdiction; 
Knabe, Pending ICJ Case questions scope of Foreign Sovereign Immunity Defense, In-
ternational Enforcement Law Report 25 (2009), 162 ff.; Bettauer, Germany sues Italy 
at the International Court of Justice on Foreign Sovereign Immunity, ASIL Insight of 
November 19, 2009, http://www.asil.org/files/insight091119pdf.pdf (accessed 29 De-
cember 2009); for further background information, see Focarelli, Federal Republic of 
Germany v. Giovanni Mantelli and others. Order No 14201, AJIL 103 (2009), 122 ff. 
2  ICJ, order of 4 July 2011, available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/143/16 
556.pdf (accessed 30 August, 2011). 
3  Jessup, Transnational Law, 1956. 
4  Hanschmann, Theorie transnationaler Rechtsprozesse, in: Buckel et al., Neue Theo-
rien des Rechts, 2nd ed., 2009, 385 ff. 
5  For the proceedings concerning the support of the South-African apartheid regime, 
see Saage-Maaß, Geschäft ist Geschäft? Zur Haftung von Unternehmen wegen der 
Förderung staatlicher Menschenrechtsverletzungen, KJ 43 (2010), 54 ff.; see also 
Blisset, Globales nunca más!, KJ 41 (2008), 279 ff. 
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I. The background 
Several different groups of non-German victims of Nazi Germany have hith-
erto been excluded from German compensation payments.6 In recent years, 
some of these groups have been able to partially attain final verdicts from na-
tional courts in Greece and Italy awarding them compensation to be provided 
by Germany.  
Once all Italian legal remedies were exhausted, the German government – 
according to its written statement to the ICJ – understands the legal action be-
fore the ICJ as the last resort to block a perceived infringement of German 
sovereignty and to prevent the impending enforcement of the Italian and Greek 
verdicts. Instead of accepting its historic responsibility by including the hith-
erto excluded groups of victims who are still seeking justice,7 The German 
government aims, with the help of the authority of the ICJ,8 to put an end to the 
remaining compensation issues for victims of Nazi Germany under civil law.9 
Concretely, three different key issues have emerged during these proceedings. 
The first matter concerns claims of Italian citizens who were deported to 
Germany during World War II in order to perform forced labour, but who were 
subsequently excluded from compensations provided by the foundation “Re-
membrance, Responsibility and Future” (RRF)10 established in August 2000. 
                                                 
6  For an overview, cf. Hense, Ein- und Ausschlüsse von NS-Opfern. Grundzüge der 
deutschen Entschädigungspolitik, in RAV-Informationsbrief 103 (2010), 44 ff. (avai-
lable at www.rav.de). 
7  See, for instance, the 10th Bericht der Bundesregierung über den Stand der Rechtssi-
cherheit für deutsche Unternehmen im Zusammenhang mit der Stiftung „Erinnerung, 
Verantwortung und Zukunft“ (31 March 2009, BT-Drs. 16-9047). 
8  The at times rather instrumental attitude of the Federal Republic towards the ICJ is 
already documented in the institution of proceedings documents. Even as the Federal 
Republic addresses the Court willingly as applicant, the Federal Government has es-
tablished, at the same time, constitutionally and legally problematic structural mea-
sures in an effort to avoid being taken to court due to acts within the framework of 
military interventions. The German declaration of 1 May 2008 recognizes the juris-
diction of the Court as compulsory, but excludes disputes relating to the deployment 
of German armed forces abroad and the use of the territory of the Federal Republic 
for military purposes from its jurisdiction, cf. BT-Drs. 16-9218 of 5 May 2008; cf. 
Bothe/Klein, Bericht einer Studiengruppe zur Anerkennung der Gerichtsbarkeit des 
IGH gemäß Art. 36 Abs. 2 IGH-Statut, ZaöRV 67 (2007), 825 ff.  
9  Klingner, Staatenimmunität als Instrument der Entschädigungsverweigerung, RAV-
Informationsbrief 102 (2009), 5 ff., http://www.rav.de/publikationen/infobriefe/info 
brief-102-2009/ (accessed 5 January 2010). 
10  For the genesis of the foundation RRF, as well as its historical, legal and political 
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These claims include in particular those of members of the Italian armed forces 
who were taken prisoner after the armistice between Italy and the Allied Forces 
in September 1943 and who had to perform forced labour as so-called Italian 
Military Internees (Internati Militari Italiani, IMI). Although the Italian captives 
had been granted neither the formal nor the material status of prisoners of war, 
they have not hitherto received any compensation for the forced labour per-
formed in the German Reich. Rather, according to the German government, they 
are to be treated – in contradiction to the factual situation in World War II – as 
unentitled prisoners of war, since their transfer from military internees to civil 
status violated international law.11 In Germany, legal action against the rejection 
of respective applications by the RRF has been unsuccessful (for instance, a con-
stitutional complaint to the Constitutional Court was dismissed in 200412), while, 
by contrast, legal actions before Italian courts have been successful. In this con-
text, the decision of the Italian Supreme Court of Cassation in the case Ferrini v. 
Germany was particularly significant for future developments. Here, the Court 
comprehensively discussed the German objection to state immunity and ap-
proved the cognizance of the Italian jurisdiction for the enforcement of claims of 
former forced labourers of Nazi Germany.13  
The second issue pertains to Italian victims of war massacres, who have 
been awarded compensation by Italian criminal courts to be provided by the 
Federal Republic of Germany. The case Milde v. Civitella can be seen as ex-
emplary in this context: In October 2006, the Military Court of La Spezia sen-
tenced a former member of the German Armed Forces (Wehrmacht), Max 
Milde, to life imprisonment for his participation in a massacre conducted by 
the tank division Hermann Göring on 29 June 1944, during which 203 civil-
ians were killed. In addition, the Court sentenced both Milde and the Federal 
Republic of Germany, as joint debtors, to pay one million Euros in compensa-
tion to the victims of the massacre or to their surviving relatives respectively. 
After the German government lodged an appeal, the Supreme Court of Cass-
                                                                                                                                                     
context, cf. Hense, Verhinderte Entschädigung, 2008. 
11  Cf. Tomuschat’s argument (who also represents the Federal Republic in the ICJ pro-
ceedings): Tomuschat, Rechtsgutachten: Leistungsberechtigung der Italienischen 
Militärinternierten nach dem Gesetz zur Errichtung einer Stiftung „Erinnerung, Ver-
antwortung und Zukunft“?, 2001, http://www.berliner-geschichtswerkstatt.de/zwangs 
arbeit/imi/imi-tomuschat-gutachten.pdf (accessed 5 January 2010). 
12  BVerfG, 2 BvR 1379/01, Decision of 28 June 2004, NJW 2004, 3257-3258. 
13  Supreme Court of Cassation, Verdict of 11 March 2004, Ferrini v. Federal Republic 
of Germany, fn 5044/2004, International Law Report 128 (2004), 658 ff.; for an in-
formative account, see Bianchi, Ferrini v. Federal Republic of Germany, AJIL 99 
(2005), 242 ff. 
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ation confirmed this verdict on 21 October, 2008.14 
The third key issue of the ICJ proceedings concerns Greek victims of Nazi 
war crimes, whose legal claims have also been dismissed by German Courts,15 
but who have attained a final verdict for compensation to be paid by Germany 
in Greece (Distomo case)16 and who are now trying to enforce this verdict in 
Italy.17 During the subsequent legal proceedings initiated by the German gov-
ernment, the Italian Supreme Court of Cassation dismissed the objection of 
state immunity and stressed the primacy of the fundamental values of freedom 
and human dignity.18 
II. The central issues for the doctrine of international law 
From a legal positivist view of international law, the issues heard by the ICJ 
revolve around two central questions. On the one hand, the cases broadly ad-
dress the emerging international law of compensation, i.e. the question of 
whether individuals can enforce their claims for compensation against states in 
the aftermath of serious human rights violations. On the other hand, they raise 
the issue of the extent to which state immunity has to be determined. In the 
words of Richard Falk, these cases are about the legal protection of “‘a repara-
tions ethos’ to the effect that individuals who have been wronged by applicable 
international human rights standards … should be compensated as fully as pos-
                                                 
14  Verdict of the Supreme Court of Cassation, Sezione I Penale. n 1972 of 21 October 
2008. See Ciampi, The Italian Court of Cassation Asserts Civil Jurisdiction over Ge-
rmany in a Criminal Case Relating to the Second World War, Journal of Internatio-
nal Criminal Justice 7 (2009), 597 ff. 
15  BGH, III ZR 245/98 Verdict of 26 June 2003, NJW 2003, 3488 ff.; BVerfG, 2 BvR 
1476/03, Decision of 15 February 2006, NJW 2006, 2542 ff. 
16  Hellenic Supreme Court (Aeropag), Verdict of 4 May 2000, KJ 2000, 472 ff.; cf. 
also comprehensively Nessou, Griechenland 1941-1944: Deutsche Besatzungspolitik 
und Verbrechen gegen die Zivilbevölkerung. Eine Beurteilung nach dem Völker-
recht, 2009, 467 ff.; Paech, Staatenimmunität und Kriegsverbrechen AVR 47 (2009), 
36 ff.; Fleischer, „Endlösung“ der Kriegsverbrecherfrage, in: Frei (ed.): Transnatio-
nale Vergangenheitspolitik, 2006, 474 ff. 
17  After unsuccessful enforcement attempts in Greece, see ECHR Kalogeropoulou et 
al. / Greece, Nr. 59021/00, decision about the admissibility of an application of 12 
December 2002, NJW 2004, 275 ff.  
18  Verdict of the United Senates of the Supreme Court of Cassation (Corte Suprema di 
Cassazione, Sezione Unite Civili), fn 14199 of 6 May 2008. 
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sible. This ethos is a challenge to notions of sovereignty”.19 
Both issues – individual claims for compensation and state immunity – 
concern central questions regarding the restructuring of international law,20 
which are briefly outlined below. 
1. Individual claims for compensation 
If the Federal Republic denies in its written statement to the ICJ the existence 
of a norm establishing direct claims for compensation under international law, 
it not only contradicts the fundamental intuition of justice according to which 
violations of pivotal personality rights such as bodily integrity and human dig-
nity have to be pre-empted, but also the idea that once such violations occur, 
they are to be compensated. The Federal Republic’s line of argument is at any 
rate directed against an emerging norm of international law according to which 
individuals possess a subjective right to compensation against a state that vio-
lates international law. 
In recent decades, the transnational process of generating law has produced 
a network of decisions, in which national courts in the United States, Italy, 
Greece, Japan, Israel, the United Kingdom, etc., have acknowledged individual 
claims for compensation.21 The “Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right 
to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International 
Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian 
Law” (Basic Principles and Guidelines) are one manifestation of this trend in 
international law at the universal level.22 With these Basic Principles and 
Guidelines, the UN General Assembly23 systematised the international law of 
compensation – and the resulting individual claims – and pointed out that the 
                                                 
19  Falk, Reparations, International Law, and Global Justice, in: de Greiff (ed.), The 
Handbook of Reparations, 2006, 478 ff. (485). 
20  For more on this issue, see generally Bothe, Wandel des Völkerrechts, in: KritV 91 
(2008), 235 ff. 
21  For extensive references on state practices, see Fischer-Lescano, Subjektivierung 
völkerrechtlicher Sekundärregeln, AVR 45 (2007), 299 ff. 
22  For further evidence, see Sassòli, State Responsibility for Violations of International 
Humanitarian Law, International Review of the Red Cross 84 (2002), 401 ff. (419); 
Bong, Compensation for Victims of Wartime Atrocities, in: Journal of International 
Criminal Justice 3 (2005), 187 ff. (203); Kalshoven, State responsibility for warlike 
acts of the armed forces, International and Comparative Law Quarterly 40 (1991), 
847 ff.; Orakhelashvili, State Immunity and Hierarchy of Norms: Why the House of 
Lords Got It wrong, European Journal of International Law 18 (2008), 955 ff. 
23  UN GA, 21 March 2006, A/RES/60/147. 
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Basic Principles and Guidelines do not develop effective customary interna-
tional law further, but only reflect it. 
This trend towards subjectivation of individual secondary rights is also con-
firmed in the United Nations’ report “International Commission of Inquiry on 
Darfur”, which investigated human rights violations in Sudan. The report 
states that  
“there has now emerged in international law a right of victims of serious 
human rights abuses (in particular war crimes, crimes against humanity 
and genocide) to reparation (including compensation) for damage result-
ing from those abuses.”24 
In an advisory opinion regarding a recent decision about the Israeli wall con-
struction,25 the ICJ also recognised the state’s obligation  
“to compensate, in accordance with the applicable rules of international 
law, all natural or legal persons having suffered any form of material 
damage as a result of the wall’s construction.”26  
The aforementioned statement has subsequently given rise to the interpretation 
“that the Court ruled in favour of a general principle to compensate individuals 
in cases where there is a violation of their rights.”27 
The German legal action therefore opposes vigorously the significant trend 
that international law  
“could – if not, should – be interpreted in such a way as to confer, on the 
individual victims of violations of international humanitarian law, a 
right to claim compensation for such violations.”28 
                                                 
24  International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur, Report to the United Nations Secre-
tary-General pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1564, 25 January 2005, cl. 597, 
http://www.un.org/News/dh/sudan/com_inq_darfur.pdf (accessed 9 December 2009). 
25  ICJ, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territory, Advisory Opinion, 9 July 2004, ICJ Rep. 2004 and I.L.M. 43 (2004), 1009 ff. 
26  ICJ, ibid., marginal number 153. 
27  Schwager, The Right to Compensation for Victims of an Armed Conflict, in: Chi-
nese Journal of International Law 4 (2005), 417 ff. (430), with further references. 
28  Hofmann, Victims of Violations of International Humanitarian Law, in: Dupuy et al. 
(eds.), Völkerrecht als Wertordnung. Tomuschat, 2006, 341 ff. (357-358), with fur-
ther references; see also Art. 6 Draft Declaration of International Law Principles on 
Compensation for Victims of War (International Law Association, Report of the 
Working Group „Compensation for Victims of War”, 2008, http://www.ila-hq.org/ 
en/committees/index.cfm/cid/1018 (accessed 5 January 2010). 
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2. Exceptions from state immunity 
As concerns state immunity, a similar structural change of international law 
can be observed.  
Within the framework of immunity against enforcement, only such meas-
ures are banned under international law which concern the state property  
“that at the point of time when the enforcement measure commences 
serves sovereign functions of the foreign state.”29  
To the extent that the German cultural institute Villa Vigoni in Italy was sub-
ject to such enforcement measures, due to the above-mentioned compensation 
claims, such a link to a central function of sovereignty is non-existent.30 
In international law, state immunity in litigation is no longer absolute. Rat-
her, the principle of state immunity is in “a process of decline;” its history has 
turned “into a history of the struggle for the number, kind and extent of excep-
tions.”31 Hersh Lauterpacht argued as early as 1951 that  
“no legitimate claim of sovereignty is violated if the courts of a state as-
sume jurisdiction over a foreign state with regard to … torts committed 
in the territory of the state assuming jurisdiction.”32  
Consequently, there is a significant trend in state practice and opinio iuris not 
to grant immunity in cases of torts and, hence, even less so in cases of gross 
violations of international law. The practice that assumes exceptions from im-
munity in the case of tort is, after all, common. It is therefore difficult to claim 
that a general state practice and opinio iuris exists according to which the ar-
mour of immunity applies without reservations in cases of gross violations of 
international law. This is even more so as, according to the “Basic Principles 
and Guidelines,” the required legal protection of victims of serious violations 
of international law includes the duty to provide  
“equal and effective access to justice … irrespective of who may ultima-
tely be the bearer of responsibility for the violation.”33  
                                                 
29  BVerfGE 46, 342, 364. 
30  Nor can it be established by a retrospective – and legally abusive – declaration of the 
cultural institute as part of the diplomatic infrastructure of Germany. 
31  BVerfGE 16, 27, 33. 
32  Lauterpacht, Jurisdictional Immunities of Foreign States, British Yearbook of Inter-
national Law 28 (1951), 229. 
33  “Basic Principles and Guidelines,” Fn 23, cl 3c. 
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Especially, for legal violations occurring in the territory of the state which ex-
ercises jurisdiction, (forum state) the immunity of the violating state is there-
fore regularly denied.34 Consequently, Art. 12 of the United Nations Conven-
tion on State Immunity provides an exception from immunity if an act or omis-
sion occurred entirely or in part in the territory of the forum state.35 The under-
lying notion is that “since the injuries covered by the exception occur within 
the forum state, that state is the most convenient forum.”36 It is therefore no 
evident violation of international law that offences committed in Italy or 
Greece are tried there and that immunity is not abjudicated; rather it is merely 
a consequence of the common interpretation of the locus delicti commissi as an 
“agreed basis or an unchallenged or undoubted basis for jurisdiction.”37 
III. Objections from the viewpoint of Rechtspolitik 
From the perspective of public international law, Germany’s success before the 
ICJ can therefore not be taken for granted, particularly since the German legal 
argumentation runs counter to the above-mentioned developments in modern 
international law.  
Why could the German government’s legal action nevertheless be successful? 
The decentralised enforcement of human rights before national courts usu-
ally faces numerous, general and specific objections – some explicit, some im-
plicit – from the viewpoint of Rechtspolitik. The three central objections are 
detailed in the following sections: (1) In the case at hand, it is argued that the 
Federal Republic has already provided a massive amount of compensation 
within the framework of global agreements and other bilateral arrangements; 
                                                 
34  See the comprehensive overview in Paech, Fn 16, 36 ff.; Cremer, Entschädigungs-
klagen wegen schwerer Menschenrechtsverletzungen und Staatenimmunität vor na-
tionaler Zivilgerichtsbarkeit, AVR 41 (2003), 137 ff.; furthermore cf. Reimann, A 
Human Rights Exception to Sovereign State Immunity, Michigan Journal of Interna-
tional Law 16 (1995), 403 ff.  
35  United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Prop-
erty of December 2, 2004, A/RES/59/38; however, the Convention has not yet come 
into effect, since the required 30 ratifications have hitherto not been deposited. 
36  Forcese, De-Immunizing Torture: Reconciling Human Rights and State Immunity, 
McGill Law Journal 52 (2007), 127 ff. (151); see also Crawford, International Law 
and Foreign Sovereigns: Distinguishing Immune Transactions, British Yearbook of 
International Law 54 (1983), 75 ff. (111). 
37  International Law Commission, Fifth report on jurisdictional immunities of States 
and their property, A/CN.4/363, 39. 
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additionally, that Italy and Greece had already waived all further claims for 
compensation. (2) More generally, an intertemporal argument is made: Today, 
it might be the case that international law recognizes individual claims and al-
lows for a decentralised enforcement, but what matters is the legal situation at 
the time the offences were committed; and those rules do not allow such a de-
centralised enforcement. (3) Finally, from a procedural perspective, some in-
ternational lawyers are apprehensive of a decentralised enforcement of human 
rights as this might result in legal chaos. 
1. Reparations and property agreements 
Let us first discuss the argument that the Federal Republic has already pro-
vided sufficient compensation for the respective offences. Overall, Germany 
has hitherto paid about 65 billion Euros in compensation. At no point, how-
ever, has the amount of compensation paid exceeded 0.7 percent of the gross 
domestic product (or seven percent of the Federal budget). During the 1960s, 
the Federal Republic entered into so-called global and complementary agree-
ments with a number of states, including Greece and Italy.38 The German gov-
ernment argues that these agreements exert an inhibiting effect on the present 
dispute.39 The present claims, according to this line of argument, would be 
contradicted by the Italian waiver of claims in Article 77, paragraph 4, of the 
1947 Peace Treaty,40 as well as by the two Italo-German Agreements dating 
back to 2 June 1961 concerning (a) the regulation of certain proprietary, eco-
nomic and financial issues, and (b) the payments in favour of Italian citizens 
who were subject to Nazi persecution.41 In accordance with these latter two 
Agreements, Germany had, in both cases, paid 40 million Deutschmarks.  
However, the 1961 agreements did not deal with the aforementioned viola-
tions of individual rights. While the “Compensation Agreement” of 1961 was 
exclusively directed at the compensation claims of Italian citizens on the 
grounds of Nazi injustice in the form of racist and political persecution, the 
“Property Agreement” aimed at resolving property-related claims. Neither of 
                                                 
38  For a historical account of the negotiations, see de la Croix/Rumpf, Der Werdegang 
des Entschädigungsrechts unter national- und völkerrechtlichem und politologi-
schem Aspekt, 1985, 251 ff.; see also Stuby, Völkerrechtliche Probleme bei der Ent-
schädigung von ausländischen NS-Zwangsarbeitern, Zeitschrift für Rechtspolitik 
1990, 314 ff. 
39  Reply of the Federal Government to a parliamentary question, BT-Drs. 16-11884 of 
10 February 2009, 2; the legal argumentation follows Tomuschat, Fn 11. 
40  Printed in AJIL 42 (1948), Suppl., 42 ff. 
41  BGBl. 1963 II p. 669/793. 
 10 
the two Agreements, however, dealt with the violations of international hu-
manitarian law tried before the ICJ today. Due to their limited scope, these 
agreements therefore cannot exert a limiting effect on compensations which 
would have to be paid due to violations of core provisions of international hu-
manitarian law.  
A similar reasoning would apply with respect to the Peace Treaty of the Al-
lied Powers with Italy of 10 February 1947. Art. 77, paragraph 4, of this Treaty 
states that  
“Italy waives on its own behalf and on behalf of Italian nationals all 
claims against Germany and German nationals outstanding on May 8, 
1945.”42  
Nevertheless, payments of reparation and those of compensation due to the 
violation of highly personal legal interests must not be equated – they are cate-
gorically different.43 Compensations for violations of pivotal rights of personal 
integrity differ from those based on reparations. In the latter case, the civil 
population is compensated for being hit by the inevitable consequences of war, 
while in the case of the former the population is subject to war crimes to be 
prevented under all circumstances according to international humanitarian 
law.44 The Peace Treaty of the Allied Forces thus regulates the issue of repara-
tions, but does not rule out any potential individual compensation claims based 
on the commitment of war crimes.45 
Furthermore, the interplay of the 1953 London Debt Agreement (LDA)46 
and the 1990 Two Plus Four Agreement47 cannot exempt the Federal Republic. 
In the post-war period, the Federal Republic initially argued, with respect to 
individual compensation claims for war crimes, that they were part of the 
moratorium under Art. 5, section 2, LDA. As a consequence all claims were 
deferred until the reparation issue had been finally clarified in a peace treaty.48 
                                                 
42  This provision can be found in Part VI, Section 1 of the Peace Treaty entitled “Repa-
rations,” which deals exclusively with the regulation of legal issues in this context. 
43  Cf. BVerfGE 94, 315 ff. (331), with further references. 
44  Similarly to this argumentation of the Aeropag, cf. Fn 16. 
45  Cf., yet without a conclusive argument for the equation of reparations and compen-
sations, Tomuschat, Fn 11, 6 (in Fn 24). 
46  Comprehensively Rombeck-Jaschinski, Das Londoner Schuldenabkommen. Die 
Regelung der deutschen Auslandsschulden nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg, 2005. 
47  BGBl. 1990 II, 1318. 
48  The Strategy of the Federal Government became obvious in a note verbale sent by 
the German Ambassador in Athens to the Foreign Ministry in 1969: “It should be in 
our interest to prolong as much as possible this transitory state of the non-
 11
According to a later line of argument, this moratorium has become irrelevant 
through the Two Plus Four Agreement, which states: “This Agreement in-
cludes the final regulation of the legal issues caused by the war.”49 However, a 
legal position arguing that the Agreement includes the dispensation with com-
pensations for Italy and Greece cannot be applied, precisely because Greece 
and Italy were not contractual parties to the Two Plus Four Agreement. Hence, 
the Agreement draws no negative consequences for the two countries, let alone 
a waiver of the position of individual rights. Any agreement to the detriment of 
a third state or its citizens is not permitted under Art. 35 of the Vienna Con-
vention on the Law of Treaties, which is part of customary international law. 
And even if an agreement to the detriment of third parties were allowed, the 
issue of compensation is at no point mentioned in the Two Plus Four Agree-
ment; thus, the issue of compensation is neither regulated explicitly nor by 
“qualified silence.” 
Finally, even if the previously mentioned agreements were intended to have 
such limiting effects, they could not be used to counter the claims of individu-
als. The Geneva Conventions of 1949 state in Article 6 and 7 respectively that 
all agreements undermining the rights of individuals established by interna-
tional humanitarian law are banned. Accordingly, Art. 7 of the IVth Geneva 
Convention, relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons, states:  
“No special agreement shall adversely affect the situation of protected 
persons, as defined by the present Convention, nor restrict the rights 
which it confers upon them.”50  
This statement expressly prohibits the waiver of rights, including the individ-
ual’s right to claim for compensation. A waiver of compensation for violations 
of pivotal individual rights in peace treaties would violate “an explicit prohibi-
tion of international humanitarian law;”51 as such, it leads the waiver agree-
ment to be void52 and rules out a limitation for those offences in question.53  
                                                                                                                                                     
completion of a peace treaty, in order to forfeit claims by our past enemies with dint 
of the passing of time”; quoted from Paech, Wehrmachtsverbrechen in Griechenland, 
KJ (1999), 381 ff. (391). 
49  Reply of the Federal Government to a parliamentary question, BT-Drs. 16-1634 of 
30 May 2006, 5. 
50  Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 
12 August 1949 (UNTS 75, 287). 
51  Sassòli, Fn 22, 419. 
52  Bong, Fn 22, 203: “a waiver … would clearly violate the explicit prohibition of 
these provisions.” 
53  See also the Verdicts of the Supreme Court of Cassation, Fn 18. 
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2. Intertemporality 
The second objection raised against the compensation claims of victims of 
World War II is of an intertemporal nature.54 It is argued that compensation 
claims cannot be asserted retrospectively. 
From an intertemporal point of view, the issue of the emergence of an in-
ternational law of compensation55 is structurally similar to that of raising the 
question about the existence of an international criminal law at the time of the 
Nuremberg Trials. Comparable to the argument made by Carl Schmitt, who 
disbelieved in the legitimacy of the Nuremberg Trials because a war of aggres-
sion was not an offence and therefore not punishable at the time the offence 
was committed,56 the exponents of the intertemporal limitation argue that, 
whereas claims for compensation perhaps have to be admitted today, this was 
not the case when the offences were committed. 
Like with International Criminal Law in Nuremberg,57 the law of compen-
sation can, however, take up many elements of international law that were in 
fact already in force when the offences were committed. Especially, Art. 3 of 
the IVth Hague Convention concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land 
of 1907 states explicitly:  
“A belligerent party which violates the provisions of the said Regula-
tions shall, if the case demands, be liable to pay compensation. It shall 
be responsible for all acts committed by persons forming part of its 
armed forces.”  
This norm has already been an established part of international customary 
law.58 
All cases mentioned above and currently being heard in The Hague are vio-
                                                 
54  For intertemporal international law, see Krause-Ablass, Intertemporales Völkerrecht, 
1970; Elias, The Doctrine of intertemporal Law, AJIL 74 (1980), 285 ff.; Higgins, 
Some Observations on the inter-temporal Rule in International Law, in: Makarczyk 
(ed.), Theory of international law at the threshold of the 21st century, 1996, 173 ff.; 
Grodecki, Intertemporal conflict of laws, 1976. 
55  Derleder, Individualentschädigungsansprüche zur Durchsetzung des Kriegsvölker-
rechts, in: IALANA (ed.), Frieden durch Recht, 2010, 331 ff. 
56  Schmitt, Das internationalrechtliche Verbrechen des Angriffskrieges und der Grund-
satz „Nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege“ (1945), in: Quaritsch (ed.), 1994. 
57  Cf. already Kantorowicz, Gutachten zur Kriegsschuldfrage 1914, mit einer Einfüh-
rung von Imanuel Geiss, 1967. 
58  Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Secu-
rity Council Resolution 808 (1993), U.N. Doc. S/25704 (3 May 1993), para. 35. 
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lations contradicting the earlier Hague Conventions. The obligation to provide 
compensation for such offences came into force already in 1907. Thus, there is 
no reason to argue about the retroactive recognition of claims for compensa-
tion. The claim for compensation rests on a legal basis, its contractual form 
being more than a century old. For this reason, the frequently used reference to 
Article 28 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties is misleading: 
there is no retrospective contractual effect, as the obligation to pay compensa-
tion has been in effect since 1907.  
Nevertheless, the problem rests not on the origin of the claim but on its en-
forcement. From an intertemporal perspective the point in time when the act 
takes place is decisive. In the present case, two relevant issues have to be distin-
guished: Firstly, whether the international humanitarian law was violated de-
pends on the legal situation at the time when the offence was committed. The 
second issue pertains to the enforcement (can individuals take action before na-
tional courts and can they refer to exceptions from state immunity?), which has 
to be assessed on the basis of the international law in effect at the time when the 
potential violations of state immunity took place. In this context, it must be 
noted that under current international law, the relevant norms can be interpreted 
as norms that entitle individuals to claim for compensation and rule out state 
immunity.59 
3. Transnational human rights protection through “role splitting” 
The third objection, pursued by opponents to an individual’s claim for com-
pensation before national courts, is of a procedural nature. It coincides with a 
debate between judges of the ICJ on the occasion of the “arrest warrant case” 
(Democratic Republic of the Congo ./. Belgium), which revolved around the 
decentralised enforcement of criminal law by means of the principle of univer-
sal jurisdiction. The judges had different ideas about the adequate form of the 
forums under international law, which became manifest especially in the joint 
separate opinion of Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal on the one 
hand, and that of President Guillaume on the other. The latter (no longer a 
member of the Court) painted a dark picture of “judicial chaos,” arguing that  
“Contrary to what is advocated by certain publicists, such a development 
would represent not an advance in the law but a step backward.”60  
                                                 
59  In this sense, see also the reasoning in the recent decision of the Tribunale Ordinario di 
Prescia, 6601/10, to refer the case to the ECJ for preliminary ruling. 
60  ICJ of 14 February 2002, Arrest warrant case (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. 
Belgium), Guillaume, cl. 15. 
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Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal countered this view by referring to the 
issue of efficiency:  
“[M]oreover, it is quite risky to expect too much of a future international 
criminal court in this respect. The only credible alternative therefore 
seems to be the possibility of starting proceedings in a foreign court.”61 
The central issue evoked in these statements concerns the role national courts 
should play in the enforcement of international law. As termed by George 
Scelle,62 “role splitting” allows national courts to become increasingly active 
as enforcers of international law.63 In doing so, they not only represent an im-
portant addition to international tribunals, but they also become engines in en-
forcing and strengthening the rule of law. For instance, Spanish and British 
courts significantly strengthened the decentralised protection against arbitrary 
state violence in the Pinochet case64 and US-American courts lead the way in 
the enforcement of a global rule of law (often even against American foreign 
policy interests).65 Thus, national courts in a number of cases have shown their 
ability to be effective actors in the struggle for the law of peace.66 
In this respect, national courts serve an important complementary function 
that is recognised under international law. Therefore, “legal chaos” is by no 
means a necessary result of such a system of decentralised and overlapping 
jurisdictions. There are numerous functional equivalents to the ideology of a 
hierarchy of norms (Stufenbau des Rechts). Especially, the fragmented sectors 
of the international legal order67 have produced mechanisms68 that by means of 
                                                 
61  ICJ, ibid., joint sep. opinion, Higgins, Kooijmans, Buergenthal, cl. 75. 
62  Scelle, Précis de droit des gens, vol. I, 1932, 47; on this Cassese, Remarks on Scel-
le’s Theory of ‘Role Splitting’ (dédoublement fonctionnel) in International Law, 
EJIL 1 (1990), 210 ff. 
63  Cf. also Bothe, Complementarity: Ensuring compliance with international law 
through criminal prosecutions, in: Die Friedens-Warte 83 (2008), 59 ff. 
64  For the Pinochet case see, among others, Brody/Ratner, The Pinochet Papers: The 
Case of Augusto Pinochet in Spain and Britain, 2000. 
65  Cf., for instance, Halfmeier, Menschenrechte und Internationales Privatrecht im 
Kontext der Globalisierung, Rabels Zeitschrift für ausländisches und internationales 
Privatrecht 68 (2004), 653 ff. 
66  Benvenisti, National courts, domestic democracy, and the evolution of international 
law, EJIL 20 (2009), 59 ff.; Shany, National Courts as International Actors: Jurisdic-
tional Implications, Hebrew University International Law Research Paper No 22/08, 
October 2008. 
67  Among others, Koskenniemi, Legal fragmentation(s), in: Calliess et al. (eds.), Sozio-
logische Jurisprudenz. Festschrift für Gunther Teubner, 2009, 795 ff. 
68  Neumann, Die Koordination des WTO-Rechts mit anderen Ordnungen. Konflikte 
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procedural norms of complementarity and by the obligation to mutual consid-
eration provide for effective forms of coordination between judicial tribunals. 
These coordination techniques can be used when human rights are imple-
mented in decentralised ways.69 
IV. Conclusion 
In these proceedings the Federal Republic, regrettably motivated by blatant eco-
nomic reasons70 and in alliance with proponents of a traditional global order, 
battles against a strengthening of forensic enforcement mechanisms. If the posi-
tion of the German government is to succeed, decades of international efforts to 
sanction war crimes not only under criminal law but also under civil law could 
be undermined. What holds true for the German government – the proceedings 
in Italy and Greece being an unwelcome incident – also applies to the Italian ex-
ecutive: The verdicts of the Italian courts – as the Italian executive might be-
come a target for compensation claims as well – are also unasked for; as unasked 
for as the proceedings of Spanish Courts against Pinochet were for the Spanish 
Aznar administration or the American Holocaust trials for the US Government.  
                                                                                                                                                     
des materiellen Rechts und Konkurrenzen der Streitbeilegung, 2002. 
69  For the notion of network and the relations of mutual consideration among courts, 
see Fischer-Lescano/Teubner, Regime-Collisions: The Vain Search for Legal Unity 
in the Fragmentation of Global Law, Michigan Journal of International Law 25:4 
(2004), 999 ff.; pointing in a similar direction: the concept of “dialectical legal inter-
action” in Berman, Global Legal Pluralism, in: Southern California Law Review 80 
(2007), 1155 (1197 ff). 
70  It can be doubted whether or not the link to Nazi crimes and their economic conse-
quences leads the Federal Government to argue in such a sovereignty-heavy manner. 
In the Varvarin case concerning claims for compensation stemming from the inter-
vention in Kosovo, the Federal Government also disputed individual claims for com-
pensation, not only substantively but also, and unnecessarily, in principle. It can only 
be hoped the BVerfG will use a pending constitutional appeal (concerning BGHZ 
169, 348 ff.) to clarify the matter. In addition, regarding the question of compensati-
on for the victims of the Kunduz incident, the Federal Government seems unprepa-
red to accept any statutory obligation. The phrase, payments should be made „ac-
cording to custom” (see Rath, Entschädigung nach Landessitte, die tageszeitung, 9 
December 2009) is similar to the US-American strategy of solatia payments in Af-
ghanistan. By this means, one attempts to locate the grounds for payments in local 
custom and to keep the issue of national or international statutory obligations to pro-
vide compensation unanswered. For solatia payments in Afghanistan, see Fischer-
Lescano, Fn 21, 363 ff. 
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Hence, the ICJ will have to decide about fundamental questions of the 
structure of the international legal order, namely on how far the power of bu-
reaucracies extends in international relations, and how the demand for the in-
clusion of victims into law71 can be implemented procedurally. If one intends 
to juridify international relations, there is no alternative but to strengthen the 
independence of law and those juridical procedures that allow for attributing 
responsibility and compensation before national courts as well.  
It is in this sense that the proceedings in The Hague are not only about com-
pensation claims of an ultimately rather assessable scope. Instead, the proceed-
ings are in fact about the very future of the global rule of law itself. In the words 
of Hans Kelsen:  
“To the extent that international law penetrates areas that heretofore 
have been the exclusive domain of national legal orders, its tendency 
toward directly authorizing and obligating individuals must increase.”72 
 
                                                 
71  See Hitzel-Cassagnes, Die Inklusion von Betroffenenperspektiven bei der Anerken-
nung von Menschenrechten, 43 (2010), 4 ff. 
72  Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law, 1978, 327. 
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